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Using probabilities in the formal-methods-based development of safety-critical software has quick-
ened interests in academia and industry. We address this area by our model-driven engineering
method for reactive systems SPACE and its tool-set Reactive Blocks that provide an extension to
support the modeling and verification of real-time behaviors. The approach facilitates the compo-
sition of system models from reusable building blocks as well as the verification of functional and
real-time properties and the automatic generation of Java code.
In this paper, we describe the extension of the tool-set to enable the modeling and verification
of probabilistic real-time system behavior with the focus on spatial properties that ensure system
safety. In particular, we incorporate descriptions of probabilistic behavior into our Reactive Blocks
models and integrate the model checker PRISM which allows to verify that a real-time system satis-
fies certain safety properties with a given probability. Moreover, we consider the spatial implication
of probabilistic system specifications by integrating the spatial verification tool BeSpaceD and give
an automatic approach to translate system specifications to the input languages of PRISM and Be-
SpaceD. The approach is highlighted by an example.
1 Introduction
Modeling and verification methods for embedded control system in domains such as avionics, auto-
motive and robotics should address a variety of software and hardware aspects including real-time and
probabilistic properties, distribution of system components, communication protocols, characteristics of
digital circuits and controllers. Real-time systems can require quantitative timing constraints which may
include guaranteed probabilities for time and spatial properties. For example, a robot may be required
to process a task in a predefined amount of time with a probability of 99.999999% to prevent expensive
maintenance operations resulting from minor damage to the equipment. It must complete the task in a
slightly larger amount of time with 100% to prevent major damage.
Here, we propose a framework for integrating probabilistic real-time verification and performance
prediction with system development. This approach extends our existing model-driven engineering
framework SPACE and its tool-set Reactive Blocks1 [17] with real-time system behavior verification
and schedulability analysis [12, 13]. Reactive Blocks enables the model-based engineering of reactive
systems by composing reusable building blocks each describing a certain sub-functionality of a system.
1Until recently, Reactive Blocks was called Arctis.
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The composed system model is automatically transformed into executable Java code [17]. Further, vari-
ous formal verification methods ensure functional correctness [17] as well as reliability [27], security [9]
and safety [12, 13] of targeted systems.
The formalism for modeling probabilistic real-time systems used in this work is based on probabilis-
tic timed automata (PTA) [22]. It incorporates both probabilistic and real-time characteristics. Probabilis-
tic properties are represented with an extension of Computational Tree Logic, i.e., PCTL [14]. PRISM
[19] is a probabilistic model checker for formal analysis of systems that exhibits stochastic behaviors. It
supports multiple-formalisms, including discrete-time Markov chains, continuous-time Markov chains,
Markov decision processes and PTA making it possible to capture the random behavior of our real-time
system model [12], for example random aspects of failure or uncertain inputs, loads or timing. We choose
PTA for the stochastic behavior since it integrates well with our existing timed-automata based real-time
system model. PTA has an equivalent descriptive power to a MDP (Markov Decision Process) [15] such
that we can use the terminology of MDP for the system descriptions. Probabilistic CTL [18] has the
capability of expressing real-time as well as probabilistic properties of a reactive system.
The tool set described in this paper involves the five engineering steps outlined below:
1. We model a system using Reactive Blocks including a simulator of its environment, in particular
the spatial conditions to be reflected. In this model, we annotate probabilities as well as real-time
behavior.
2. The model is analyzed with the model checker built into Reactive Blocks for functional errors and
transformed into an executable simulator.
3. The simulator is carried out and, during the simulation, traces capturing spatiotemporal behavior
with or without annotated probabilities are extracted for spatial verification.
4. The extracted spatiotemporal behavior is verified for possible spatial implications like collisions
using our BeSpaceD tool [6]. Here, distributions capturing the combined probabilistic time behav-
ior of the subcomponents are created from the extended Reactive Block models using the PRISM-
based analysis.
5. If all analyses are passed, the simulator sub-functionality is removed from the Reactive Blocks
model such that its core functionality can be transformed into executable code.
In this paper, we have three main contributions.
1. A novel approach for system performance predictions is introduced. In particular, we present
a probabilistic real-time state-machine for software component performance descriptions. This
so-called PRTESM is an extension of the External State Machines (ESMs) [16] used in Reactive
Blocks. It allows to express probabilistic real-time assumptions and guarantees of a building block.
That enables us to compose the PRTESMs of the various building blocks forming a system to
predict probabilities of the overall system behavior.
2. We show the integration of the model-checker PRISM [19] to the tool-set. For that, the PRTESMs
are transformed into PTAs [22] and the performance predictions of the overall system to PCTL
statements [14] which can be directly proven by PRISM.
3. We look at spatial implications of probabilities in system behavior. The introduction of known
probabilities into system behavior allows us to calculate how likely a physical unit like a robot will
be present in a given area in space. We use the tool BeSpaceD [6] for this.
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Figure 1: Layout of the moving robot
1.1 Guiding Example
We illustrate the tool set by a scenario of a moving robot in a factory hall featuring probabilistic behavior.
Figure 1 provides a spatial layout of the example scenario. The moving robot occupies a 2 x 2 meters
space in the 120 x 30 meters factory hall and moves along a straight line in the center of the room
covering a distance of 100 meters. The maximum speed of the robot can reach 10 ms and thus a collision
with a human may lead to fatal injuries. To eliminate such injuries, the hall is equipped with sensors
monitoring the robot for approximations of humans. If the robot comes close to a human, it is slowed
down or even stopped. The probabilistic aspect of this example comprises probability distributions on
the reaction time once a human is detected. In this paper, the robot controller and a simulator of the
continuous robot behavior are developed and implemented using Reactive Blocks.
1.2 Overview
The paper is arranged as follows: In Section 2, we give a description of the model of the robot control
system example in Reactive Blocks realizing the distributed control functions as well as the robot simula-
tion. Section 3 introduces our formalism for probabilistic time constraint and the translation into PRISM
input. Section 4 presents our approach for spatial implications of probabilistic system behaviors and
introduces the tool for probabilistic spatiotemporal property verification. We present the verification of
our properties in Section 5. Related work is discussed in Section 6 followed by a conclusion in Section 7.
2 Modeling Control Functions
In the moving robot example sketched in Section 1.1, the three main activities are:
1. Polling of sensor data about the positions of the robot and the human2.
2. Deciding the correct operation mode of the robot based on the distance to the human.
3. Forwarding an altered operation mode to the robot controller.
All three activities together should be performed within 0.5 s at maximum.
We model these control functions as well as the simulator of the human and robot behaviors sepa-
rately from each other by different building blocks. In SPACE and Reactive Blocks, a building block
2For simplicity, we only consider the human closest to the robot.
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Figure 2: UML activity of building block Control Unit
consists of a behavioral model in the form of a UML activity [17] supplemented by an External State
Machine (ESM) [16] describing its interface behavior.
The safety controller protecting humans from collisions with the fast moving robot is specified by
the building block Control Unit. The UML activity modeling the behavior of this block is shown in
Figure 2. Similar to Petri Nets, the control and data flows are represented by the flow of tokens in
the activities. These tokens are passed by the activity edges towards vertices. Vertices can be control
elements (such as forks duplicating tokens) or operations (associated with Java methods executed when
a token arrives). Further, activities may contain call behavior actions like Controller, Position Sensor and
Person Sensor each referring to another building block. The interaction between the activity containing
a call behavior action of a building block and the one referring to its behavior is modeled by pins and
parameter nodes. Parameter nodes are the identifiers at the edge of an activity, e.g., startRobot in block
Control Unit. All parameter nodes of an activity are available as pins in the call behavior actions referring
to its building block (e.g., setRed in block Controller). The semantics defines that a token reaching a pin
of a call behavior action continues from the corresponding parameter node of the activity referring to the
behavior of the call behavior action and vice versa.
Position Sensor and Person Sensor refer to the sensors for the positions of the robot and human
which get the current position information from the simulation via their input pins sensePos. The block
Controller realizes the safety controller of the system. It polls the robot and human positions every 10 ms
using the pins poll and read. From these inputs, the distance between human and robot is computed and
the correct operation mode is selected. Altogether, there are three operation modes that are defined as
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(a) ESM of Control Unit. (b) ESM of Robot Operation.
Figure 3: ESMs of building blocks Control Unit and Robot Operation
follows:
• Normal mode: If no human is closer than 25 meters to the robot, the robot accelerates with 5ms2
until reaching a speed of 10ms . When it is 11 m close to its endpoint, it decelerates with 5
m
s2 until
reaching a speed of 1ms which is carried until reaching the endpoint.
• Yellow mode: If a human is detected in a distance of less than 25 meters but more than 10 meters,
the robot is slowed down with a rate of 10ms2 until reaching a speed of 2
m
s (resp. 1
m
s if it is closer
than 11 m to its endpoint).
• Red mode: If the human is within 10 meters range to the robot, the robot makes an emergency stop
with a deceleration of 15ms2 .
The behavior of the building block Control Unit is specified by its ESM depicted in Fig. 3(a). An
ESM is a UML state machine describing which of its parameter nodes are passed by tokens in a certain
transition. Control Unit is initiated by parallel flows through the parameter nodes startRobot and start-
Person which contain the initial positions of robot and human. Thereafter, the building block is in state
active in which the environment (symbol / right of the parameter node identifier) may send position data
via parameter nodes senseRobot and sensePerson while from the block itself (/ left of the parameter node
identifier) the current operation mode may be sent via setNormal, setYellow and setRed. The building
block is terminated and all remaining tokens on its activity are removed if the activity containing the call
behavior action of the block is terminated as well which is described by the transition /.
Figure 4 shows the UML activity of building block Robot Operation. It contains the building block
Mode Selector storing the current operation mode. Robot Controller models the controller of the robot,
which chooses the current robot speed according to the operation mode and the position of the robot in
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Figure 4: UML activity of building block Robot Operation
the factory hall. Using the block Robot Physics we model the simulator for the robot. The continuous
behavior is specified by a difference equation which is executed every 5 ms.
The ESM of block Robot Operation in Figure 3(b) determines that the block is started by parallel
token flows via the parameter nodes duration and initPos which refer to the execution time of the dif-
ference equation (i.e., 5 ms) and the initial position of the robot. In state active, the operation modes
normal, yellow or red may be received by the environment while by pos the current position of the robot
may be forwarded towards the sensor in block Control Unit. The block is terminated by a token coming
via parameter node stop which leads to an output via stopped. This signal leads to the termination of all
inner blocks followed by the termination of Robot Operation.
The third block of the example is called Suicidal Human. This somehow odd name refers to the
simulation of a human attempting to approach the robot as fast as humanly possible. So, it describes the
worst case situation to be solved by the safety controller. Like the robot, the behavior of the human is
specified by a difference equation that is executed every 5 ms. For the sake of brevity, we do neither list
this block nor the other blocks of our system in detail here.
After creating and composing all building blocks of our system, we can check them for the presence
of functional design errors like not fulfilling their ESMs (see [17]). Further, if all checks are passed,
Reactive Blocks automatically generates executable Java of our system which can be carried out to
simulate robot runs.
2.1 Probability Assumptions and Temporal Safety
As discussed above, the factory hall, in which humans and machines collaborate in close proximity,
is monitored by camera sensors for collision avoidence. A safety controller constantly monitors the
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Table 1: Accumulative probability distribution of the execution times for the different tasks
Delay Type Maximum Time Probability Fig. 5 Fig. 6
Time to fetch sensor data including 15 ms 10 %
polling delay 17 ms 40 %
18 ms 85 %
19 ms 99.998 %
20 ms 100 %
Processing time recognition unit 250 ms 10 %
260 ms 30 %
270 ms 60 %
280 ms 90 %
285 ms 99 %
290 ms 100 %
Communication time recognition 15 ms 80 % r1
unit to robot 16 ms 98 % r2
16.5 ms 99.5 % r3
16.9 ms 99.99999995 % r4
20 ms 100 % r5
Internal robot processing time and 150 ms 5 % r1
actuator reaction 159 ms 90 % r2
160 ms 95 % r3
165 ms 99.9995 % r4
170 ms 100 % r5
operation for the proximity of humans and then decides which operation mode to choose. Of course, to
avoid collisions when the robot is still moving, we have to guarantee maximum reaction times for the
different functions carried out in order to slow down or stop the robot. The four main sub-tasks are the
fetching of sensor data including the delay between two pollings of the sensors, the processing time of
the safety controller in order to compute the distances between human and robot and to decide about the
correct operation mode, the communication delay between the safety and the robot controller as well as
the processing time of the robot controller including delays within the robot starting to break.
For elaborating our approach, we assume that the probabilities for the reaction times associated with
the sub-tasks correspond to the percentages depicted in Table 1. They show the probability that a task is
finished within a certain time in an accumulative way. For instance, according to the table, the fetching
of the sensor data is finished within 15 ms with a probability of 10 % while the overall probability that
it is completed within 17 ms is 40 %. Thus, we guarantee that this task is carried out within 20 ms. Of
course, in practice one cannot give axiomatic guarantees of real-time properties since a control system
is always subject to external influences like a failure of the computer hardware running it. We decided
to ignore these kinds of external error in our models but are aware that, when our tool chain is used for
real hazard analysis, such faults have to be taken into account as well. The values in the table do not
correspond to an existing system, but rather represent typical values one might expect in some field-bus
based systems.
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Figure 5: PRTESM for the ControlUnit block
3 Probabilistic Real-Time Extended State Machines
Following the concept of Timed Automata [1], we extended our external state machines (ESM) to Real-
Time ESMs (RTESM) in [12, 13]. RTESMs allow the specification of deadlines for the time a building
block may rest in a certain RTESM state. As a new contribution in this paper, we introduce the further
extension of the RTESMs to Probabilistic Real-Time External State Machines (PRTESM). Extending
the habitual pattern in Reactive Blocks to model functional and non-functional interface properties of
building blocks, the PRTESMs make the description of probabilistic real-time behavior possible and
allow to describe discrete probability distributions like the ones listed in Table 1. PRTESMs allow a
straightforward transformation into Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) [22] that can be model checked
by verification tools like PRISM [19, 20].
Figures 5 and 6 show the PRTESMs of the blocks Control Unit and Robot Operation. To facilitate
the transformation into PTAs, a PRTESM contains an initial state initial representing both the initial and
final states of the corresponding ESM. Moreover, the PRTESM may contain special states that express
probabilistic behavior of the concerned actions as well as the synchronization semaphores and timed
constraints used to model real-time properties. In the PRTESMs listed in Figures 5 and 6, the values r1,
r2, r3, r4, r5 represent the probabilities from the third resp. forth section in Table 1. The time deadlines
are measured in 100 microseconds.
The approach for the generation of a PTA from a PRTESM for a real-time blocks is semi-automatic.
• First, a set of communication actions are identified in the building block concerning the under-
neath hardware or communication protocol. In our example in the building block Control Unit, the
parameter pins setNormal, setYellow, setRed and sensePerson realize the communication among
distributed agents in the moving robot scenario. The setX set of parameters realize communication
between robot controller and robot actuator while the sensePerson parameter realizes the commu-
nication between camera sensor and robot controller. Thus we extract the probabilistic real-time
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Figure 6: PRTESM for RobotOperation block
actions in the system to PRTESM and ignore other actions.
• Second, transitions corresponding to distributed communications are transformed to new states
and transitions expressing probabilities. In our example these are: active→setNormal active,
active→setYellow active, active→setRed active and active→sensePerson active.
The code excerpt in Figure 7 corresponds to the PRTESM in Figure 5 and illustrates the correspond-
ing Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA) of the building block Control Unit. The formalism declaration
pta demands that the following modules follow the timed automata style. Time and probability values
are declared as constant values before the module declaration. c2 Control Unit prtesm is the module
name. A PTA transition in PRISM is started with a pair of brackets ([]) and optional synchronization
commands in the brackets, e.g., a semaphore i initializes distributed building blocks simultaneously dur-
ing the system initialization, and semaphores r,y are abbreviated from communication parameter setRed,
setYellow to synchronize module Control Unit (robot controller) and module Robot Operation (robot ac-
tuator). ESM transitions which are labeled as real-time probabilistic actions are exported and extended
with probabilistic description. Line 14 to 17 gives an example command in PRISM showing the proba-
bilities. It declares that when s c2 variable equals to 2 it has 80% possibility of going to state 5, 98%-80%
possibility of going to state 6. When state 5 is reached, guard conditions demand that clock c c2 must be
no greater than 150 (representing the system delay in 100 microseconds) and not smaller than 160 (see
also Table 1).
4 Probabilistic Spatial Property Verification
Probabilities in system models can affect the spatial behavior of systems. Depending on the specifica-
tion — as provided by Reactive Blocks — we can determine areas in time and space which a system
component is likely to occupy or interact with.
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1. pta
2. const int c2_1 = 150; // time unit 0.0001 s
3. const int c2_2 = 160;
4. ...
5. const double r1 = 0.8; // probability
6. const double r2 = 0.98; // accumulative probability
7. module c2_Control_Unit_prtesm
8. s_c2 : [0..10] init 0;
9. c_c2 : clock;
10. flag_c2 : bool init false;
11. [i] s_c2=0 -> (s_c2 ’=1);
12. [r] s_c2=1 -> (s_c2 ’=2)&( c_c2 ’=0);
13. ...
14. [sensePerson] s_c2=1 -> (s_c2 ’=2)&( c_c2 ’=0);
15. [] s_c2=2 -> r1 : (s_c2 ’=5) + r2 -r1 : (s_c2 ’=6)
16. + r3 -r2 : (s_c2 ’=7) + r4 -r3 : (s_c2 ’=8)
17. + r5 -r4 : (s_c2 ’=9);
18. [y] s_c2 =5&c_c2 <=c2_1 -> (s_c2 ’=10);
19. [y] s_c2 =6&c_c2 >=c2_1&c_c2 <=c2_2 -> (s_c2 ’=10);
19. ...
20. [] s_c2 =10 -> (s_c2 ’=10) & (flag_c2 ’=true);
21. endmodule
Figure 7: Excerpt of PTA codes corresponds to Figure 5.
In our robot system the distribution of latencies for reacting to the detection of a human can result in
different areas indicating the possible positions of a robot for given time points, each one associated with
a probability. Another example is varying speed. If the speed sensors of the robot are not accurate, they
may come with a distribution of a possible error. Therefore the robot may accelerate to a speed slightly
higher or lower than the specified 10 m/s. As depicted in Fig. 8, this inaccuracy leads to a wider area,
the robot may be in at a certain point of time, and the sizes of the areas increase over the distance the
robot moves. Furthermore, one can relate the area sizes also with probabilities. Following the discrete
probability distribution in Table 1, in Fig. 9 we show the varying areas covered by the robot. With a
probability of 80 % it will be within the orange rectangle at a selected point of time, with 90 % in the
dark yellow one and with certainty in the light yellow one.
For collision analysis we may neglect probabilities that are below a certain threshold defining residual
risks that one is willing to bear. In our example, we can prove that there is indeed a situation that a
person running into the factory hall with a speed of 10ms , may hit the robot before it completely stopped.
According to the distribution in Table 1, the risk for this, however, is not higher than 5 ·10−14. Since we
found out by simulating the situation that the speed of the robot at such an impact is 0.625ms at most,
the collision risk is extremely low and the impact essentially not different from the human running into
a stationary object.
We implemented BeSpaceD, a tool [6] for checking spatial behavior of spatiotemporal systems as
well as an input language for such systems. The implementation is done in Scala and comprises ab-
stract datatypes that indicate spatial availability, interaction or occupation in areas in a coordinate sys-
tem for time intervals or timepoints. It is possible to give parameterized specifications describing non-
deterministic systems and their spatial behavior.
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Figure 9: Space occupation and probability
For this work, however, we restrict ourselves to the checking of scenarios generated from simulation
runs of Reactive Blocks models. Particularly, in a simulator run we stored every five milliseconds a
tuple consisting of the current time stamp and the positions of human and robot in a format readable by
BeSpaceD. Thereafter, we use BeSpaceD to detect collisions and other spatial interactions for the various
scenarios and probabilities. In this way, we found out the situation mentioned above that a human indeed
may collide with the robot before it has stopped. We are able to learn such space-related safety issues
already while modeling the system. This makes it much easier to adapt the system functionality or to
impose stricter real-time properties if non-bearable situations were detected.
The specification of each spatial entity in a scenario has the form:
time= t −→
occupied spatial area with probability p ∧ ... ∧ occupied spatial area with probability p′
time= t+1 −→
occupied spatial area with probability p ∧ ... ∧ occupied spatial area with probability p′
....
time= t+n −→
occupied spatial area with probability p ∧ ... ∧ occupied spatial area with probability p′
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Figure 10: Probability density function for the system
Probabilities are treated as attributes to an occupied spatial area. Different means to check spatial prop-
erties — here collisions — formulated over these inputs are provided in BeSpaceD and are based on SAT
and SMT solving and direct Scala implementations.
5 Probability Distributions as Verification Results
We verify probabilistic properties based on the probabilistic timed temporal logic PTCTL [25]. The
probability operator P=? allows reasoning about numerical probabilistic values, and is supported by the
so called stochastic games engine [21] in the verification tool PRISM. The results of our property verifi-
cation are probability distributions. Figure 10 shows the non-accumulative probability distribution of the
overall system reaction time displayed in a histogram. The x axis represents time values with a frequency
of 0.02 s. The y axis shows the numerical probability value.
In our analysis, we verified a set of probabilities expressed in PTCTL as follows:
P=?[F≤T ′′target ′′](T ∈ [0.0, ...0.5])
In the above temporal specification formula, the operator F is a path operator that equals to eventually in
LTL and can be used inside the P operator. The pattern F≤T stands for “within T time unit”. The logical
expression “target” inside the PTA models that the parallel composed real-time probabilistic actions are
indeed executed. The formula expresses the possibility that within T time units, the labeled actions are
achieved.
Important for us are questions like: Is the robot reaction time no more than a designed safe time
limit of 0.46 s? Checking that a reaction time of 0.46 s is enough to avoid a collision is discovered
by simulation using Reactive Blocks and BeSpaceD. With PTCTL we check this property using the
following formula:
P=?[F≤4600 ′′target ′′]
The result indicates that when a human enters the monitored area, the robot reacts within 0.46 s with
the probability of 99.99874114988752 %. Due to the potential severity of a collision, this number does
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not seem sufficient. We discussed in Sect. 4 that the impact will not be serious with a reaction time of
0.5 s. Of course, if the robot controller reacts within 0.47 s, the maximum speed at impact will be even
lower (i.e., 0.125ms at most according to our simulations) and the risk of injuries is seen to be remote.
Considering this fact, we assume that the layout of our example system as sufficiently safe.
6 Related Work
Here, we present related work regarding formal methods, safety analysis, probabilities and spatial verifi-
cation.
In [14] an algorithm is presented to check whether a given Markov Chain satisfies formulas of Proba-
bilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL). PCTL and related verification techniques are typically applied
to analyze the reliability of timed systems. The work presented in [20] presents an algorithm for the
verification of probabilistic real-time systems annotated with discrete probability distributions. This can
be seen as a starting point for our work.
Safety analysis is a critical phase in the development of the systems we are aiming at. In [24], a
solution for incorporating safety requirements in software architecture is provided. Means facilitating
Model-Driven Architecture based development and safety analysis are presented. The work presented in
[11] aims at providing a modeling framework for the hazard analysis of component-based systems. The
authors intended to include traditional hazard analysis techniques, e.g., Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), but
found its inappropriateness for component based systems. Thus, new techniques like State Event Fault
Tree (SEFT) are proposed. The new proposed model is suitable for describing stochastic behaviors with
the help of existing tools such as Matlab/Simulink. These can be extended to support such models. In [23]
an extension of concurrent Kleene algebras is provided. An axiomatisation for probabilistic, concurrent
and nondeterministic systems is presented, and the simulation and verification of probabilistic automata
can be carried out. In the past we have studied the application of probabilistic models in a theorem prover
for guaranteeing fault-tolerance of embedded systems [3].
A process algebra-like formalism for describing and reasoning about spatial behavior has been in-
troduced in [7, 8]. Process algebras come with a precise formal semantics and target the specification of
highly parallel systems. Another logic-based approach to describe spatial areas is the Region Connec-
tion Calculus (RCC) [2]. It includes spatial predicates to describe the separation and connection of areas.
The area of hybrid systems has features the development of different tools for reasoning and verification.
SpaceEx [10] allows the modeling of continuos hybrid systems based on hybrid automata. It can be
used for computing overapproximations of the space occupied by an object moving in time and space.
Additionally, it is possible to model spatial behavior in more general purpose oriented verification tools
in Hybrid systems (e.g., [26]).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an approach for the model-driven development of probabilistic real-time sys-
tems with highly reusable compositional building blocks that incorporate discrete probability distribu-
tions for describing stochastic time behaviors. These extensions are used to predict system performance
as well as probabilistic safety properties. In addition, we established a development tool set both for
temporal and spatial probabilistic behaviors of systems. The Probabilistic Real-Time External State Ma-
chines (PRTESM) of building blocks give a straightforward view of stochastic real-time behaviors of
component-based systems. Software architects and safety engineers can use this for verification and
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analysis. The limitations of the approach is that some intral or inter components’ communications are,
instead, described as messages passed and received in UML, such that such behaviors can not be cap-
tured by ESMs. Also, whether this approach is applicable depends on the abstraction level. In the future,
we want to further study and emphasize the compositionality of probabilistic spatial behavior defini-
tions, i.e., of systems composed of appropriately logically detailed subsystems. We plan to advance the
description logic as well as the introduction of a probabilistic spatial behavioral type infrastructure that
extends previous work [4, 5].
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